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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
TONY PECHARICH, 
Applicant and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COmfiSSION 
OF UTAH and THE INDEPENDENT 
COAL & COKE. COMPANY, a Cor-
poration, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since there were three hearings in this matter 
it will be necessary when referring to the transcript 
in this brief to designate which transcript is re-
ferred to. Therefore, when the term of "Tr." is 
used it is understood that the transcript of the first 
hearing is referred to and when the term "'2nd Tr." 
is used it is understood that it refers to the tran-
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script of the second hearing and when the tenn '' 3rd 
~Tr.'' is us.ed it is understood that it refers to th~ 
transcript of the third hearing. 
Tony Pecharich was a track layer for the In-
dependent Coal & Coke Company. He used some 
kind of an instrument called a rail bender to bend 
the tracks. (Tr. 7). 
On August 6, 1937 about 11 :30 A. M. of said 
day, about one year after he started to work for 
said coal company, he was engaged on a track 
attempting to bend a rail with the rail bender when 
the rail crystalized and broke. He had his whole 
weight in use at the time of the breaking of the rail, 
which caused him to fall backwards upon the rail. 
His spine, from the buttocks to the neck, came into 
contact with said rail. He was in the mine at the 
time an~ his light went out. The man who was help-
ing him jumped and pulled h1m to the side and 
asked him if he got hurt. He was dazed and tem-
porarily knocked unconscious. Some water was 
given him and after some little while the mine fore-
man took him outside the mine. (Tr. 6, 9, and 10). 
He told the mine foreman that he believed he 
could make it to his house, which was 3 or 4 blocks' 
away. He was not able to see the doctor until 
about 5:00 o'clock that evening. He was taken to 
Dr. Roy ·W. Robinson, the company doctor, who 
examined the applicant and found his back bruised 
and tender in the lumbar sacral region. He strapped 
up applicant's back, after which applicant was 
taken home. (Tr. 11, 38 and 39). 
The applicant from that time continued to 
suffer with pains in his back, both in the lower and 
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upper part. After about a week, namely on August 
13, 1937, :Mr. Pecharich returned to work on the 
advice of Dr. Robins.on. However, he continued to 
suffer with pain and found it hard for him to carry 
on his work. He received some assistance, but the 
foreman from time to time complained about his 
not being able to do the work and on or about Feb-
ruary 1, 1938 he was discharged by the defendant 
company. The applicant has never been well since 
the accident. (Tr. 27 and 2d Tr. 9, 10, 16, 17, 23., 
24 and 27). After this Dr. J. C. Hubbard attended 
him and treated him for rheumatism. The appli-
cnnt was told that he was suffering from rheunl-
atism, but owing to the fact that he had an im-
pression that rheumatism was not compensible he 
did not make application for compensation before 
the Industrial Commission immediately. It seemed 
that Dr. Hubbard could not find out the real cause 
nf the continued suffering of the ~applicant. He 
sent the applicant to Salt Lake where he was ex-
amined by doctors, but it was not until the spring 
of 1939 that any X-rays were taken. The applicant 
was advised some time before to get X-rays, but 
he did not have any money to pay for them. Fin-
ally, however, through the efforts of Dr. Harrow, 
nt Salt Lake, the defendant company agreed to 
8tand the expense of X-rays. It was after the 
X-rays were taken and it was discovered that the 
applicant was suffering from hypertrophic osteo 
arthritis of the dorsal and lumbar spine that the 
~applicant made application to the Industrial Com-
mission for compensation. The date of the appH-
cation was May 26, 1939. About the same time the 
applicant called on and was examined by Dr. A. K. 
Bramwell, a chiropractor at Price and Dr. George 
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A. Wilson, a chiropractor at Salt Lake City. These 
two chiropractors. found that he was suffering from 
a sub-luxation of the spine caused by trauma. Both 
of these chiropractors testified that in their opinion 
the applicant's present condition is a result of the 
injury sustained. (Tr. 55 and 3rd Tr. 45). ~rhere 
were also X-rays taken to ascertain the condition 
of one of the applicant's elbows and knees. These 
did not show any evidence of arthritis in those 
joints. 
The employment by the defendant company 
was admitted. It was also admitted that the in-
jury took place and that the wages. of the appli-
cant were an amount sufficient to entitle him to 
maximum compensation if the case is compensible. 
There is no dispute about the fact that the appli-
cant had four minor children at the time of the 
accident. 
The hearings were not had before the com-
missioners or any of them, but were had beforP 
what is called hy the commission in their decision 
an "examiner." The commission found that 
applicant is, and has been, suffering from hyp-er-
trophic osteo arthritis of the dorsal and lumbar 
spine and has since February 4, 1938 been totally 
disabled as a result of said arthritis. They further 
found that the disability was not caused and thRt 
the cause thereof was not proximately contributed 
to by the accident. On January 25, 1940 the commis-
sion denied applicant's claim for compensation and 
within 30 days thereafter a motion for rehearing 
was made on behalf of the applicant, hut on Feb-
ruary 26, 1940 said motion was denied by said com-
mission. 
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH 
APPLICANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL 
OF THE DECISION AND JUDGME,NT OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMnliSSION: 
1. 
That the commission erred in denying appli-
cant's application for compensation. 
2. 
rrhat the commission erred in deciding that said 
arthritis was not caused or proximately contributed 
to by the accident. 
3. 
That the commission exceeded its authority and 
had no power to appoint an examiner to hear the 
evidence. 
4. 
That the so-called exannner had no authority 
to administer oaths. 
5. 
That all of said hearings before said exannner 
were void and of no effect because of lack of juris-
diction. 
6. 
That said commission erred in denying appli-
cant's motion for rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
Errors listed as one and two will be discussed 
together. 
The applicant claims that the Industrial Com-
mission in denying compensation acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously and that its decision is a result 
of surmise. It is the writer's purpose to show this 
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:Court that reasonable men, if doubts are resolved 
in favor of applicant, could not differ on the ques-
tion that the accident if not causing the applicant's 
present disability, at least lighted up and aggra-
vated an arthritic condition which previously 
existed. 
Is there any substantial evidence to show that 
the accident did not cause or aggravate the disease 
other than opinion evidence? One can search the 
record and he will find none. Dr. Ralph Richards 
seems to be quite positive in his own opinion that 
the accident had nothing to do with the applicant's 
present condition. This, however, is only his opin-
ion. The physical facts to the eyes of any layman 
show that he is in error. One may testify that 
this paper is black. He may be an expert on paper 
and through some error or misconception still tes-
tify that this paper is black when in truth and in 
fact it is white. The physical facts from all of the 
surrounding circumstances may prove the error of 
such a statement. Dr. Richards is not a bone spe-
cialist and he so admitted, although he has had 
many bone cases as any general practitioner would. 
At the same time he has not specialized in the 
bone. 
Is there any substantial evidence to show that 
the accident did eam;;e or ag·gravate the disease 
other than opinion evidence 1 The transcripts are 
filled with such evidence. Tony Pecharich testi-
fied that he was well before the accident. Josephine 
Pecharich, his wife, testified that outside of the 
time he had flu and was sick a little bit in 1918 
that he has never been sick. That prior to the acci-
dent he had never suffered from any pains in the 
back and that before the accident he never suffered 
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from rheumatism. :Mary Palady and J olm Palady 
testified to the same affect. ( Tr. 68 and 70). 
Charles Bezyack, who ha~ known the applicant for 
15 years, said that prior to the accident, to his 
knowledge, that Tony Pecharich never had rheum-
atism and that he was well and a hard worker and 
that before that time he neYer con1pla.ined of his 
health. (Tr. 97). Joe Kochevar said that he has 
known the applicant for 10 years and that prior to 
J\.ugust 6, 1937 he was in good health. (Tr. 101). 
),[ark Patrick testified that before the accident the 
applicant's health was good. (2d Tr. 8). Mrs. 
Millie Pascual testified that she knew the appli-
cant for three years and that before the accident 
he was engaged in hard work and was a fairly 
stout man and that she often wished her hushand 
was as stout as he was. (2d Tr. 22). 
All of these witnesses also testified that ever 
since the accident !ir. Pecharich has not been well, 
that he has been suffering and has continued to go 
down hill physically. There is no substantial evi-
dence from any of the other witnesses that the-
applicant was not in good health before the accident. 
Mr. James Collins, who at the time of the hearing 
and at· the time of the accident was an employee of 
the defendant company, testified that Mr. Pech-
nrich was slower than the rest of them in his walk-
ing and that when he sat down to work he put his 
legs under him. He said he thought that was 
peculiar because he did not do it. (3rd Tr. 56 and 
57). This could not be considered very substantial 
evidence for the reason that Collins is an employee 
of the defendant company and could have easily 
been mistaken concerning the time when he saw· 
him walk and sit. No doubt when he saw this it 
was after the accident when he came hack on the 
job. Dr. Hubbard said something about the fact 
that he treated him for rheumatism before the 
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accident, but on further examination it was brought 
out that he had the impression the accident hap-
pened ·in September, 1938 instead of 1937. He also 
testified that he took out Mr. Pecharich's teeth, but. 
he, no doubt, is in error on this point because of the 
fact that Mr. Pecharich testified that he was in 
Nevada at the time his teeth were taken out in 1935. 
(Tr. 72 and 106). The evidence shows that the ill.., 
ness and pain of the applicant has been continuous 
since the accident. The defendant company has not 
shown any other thing that has caused his present 
condition. 
A case which seems to the writer to be in 
point on this question is 
Andreason et al. v. Industrial Commission 
et al., reported in 100 P. (2d) 202 
and decided by the Supreme- Court of Utah on 
March 13, 1940. In that case the applicant had been 
suffering from a disease which came on while he 
was employed by the Colorado By-Products Com-
pany. This Court reversed the Industrial Com-
mission's denying of compensation on the theory 
that it was affirmatively shown that the applicant 
had no outside contacts with diseased animals or 
diseased matter and that since he was working for· 
a company where those contacts might have been 
had that the presumption was that the disease was 
oo.used while in the course of his employment. 
The writer doe.s not think that this Court will 
R11stain a rule that. all the defendant has to do is 
to get a doctor to testify positively that in his 
opinion the accident had nothing to do with the 
applicant's present condition, in order to be en-
titled to a denial of compensation; not when thr 
glaring and outstanding facts show otherwise. 
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A case interesting on this point is one entitled 
Wroten v. \Voodley Petroleum Company 
decided in the State of Louisiana in 
1929 and reported at 12± So. 542 : 
Plaintiff was injured June 18, 1928 by falling 
a distance of about eight feet. He bruised his side, 
back and right shoulder and continued to suffer 
pain. Compensation was paid to August 1, 1928. 
It was later discovered that plaintiff had arthritis 
and the court looked as to the state of plaintiff's 
health before the accident. 
The following was said by the Court on page 
543: 
"\V e realize that the mere fact that a work-
man has sustained an injury which pro-
duces immediate disability is found some 
time after the accident to be afflicted with 
a disease, which may have resulted from 
the accident, does not raise any presump-
tion that the accident caused the disease; 
however, when, in- addition to the circum-
stances stated, it is shown that the work-
man was in good health prior to the 
accident without any symptoms of dis-
ease, and that the illness or pain immediate-
ly following; the accident had been con-
tinuous, we think the presumption should 
be that the accident caused the disease, and 
that the workman is entitled to compen-
sation for the resu.lting disability.'' 
The judgment was affirmed. 
Another Louisiana case 
Patrick v. Grayson & Yeary et al, decided 
in 1930 and reported at 127 So. 116, 
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the plaintiff was injured by a st.rain when attempt-
ing to crank an engine. The Court held that an 
arthritic condition had been accelerated and plain-
tiff was entitled to compensation for disability 
partly caused by the arthritis. 
As to when a witness may not be disbelieved 
or disregarded is set forth in the case of 
Rukavina et al v. Industrial Commission, 
decided in the Supreme Court of Utah 
in 1936 and reported at 248 P., page 
1103. 
On page 1106 the Court states as follows: 
''The contention made is in the .affirm-
ative, but that the commission arbitrarily 
disbelieved and dis.regarded such testimony, 
especially the testimony of the mother and 
of one of the children. It may readily be 
conceded that on a trial of issues of fact 
the co:m.mJissio'n, like ·any other trier of 
fact, whether court or jury, is the sole judge 
of the facts, and the credibility of the wit-
nesses, and the weight to be given their 
testimony; still, like a court or jury, the 
commission is required to take as true un-
disputed or uncontradicted testimony or 
eviednce, if not opposed to probabilities 
or common knowledge, or not contrary to 
natural or physical law, or inherently im-
probable, or inconsistent with facts and 
circumstances in evidence, or contradictory 
in itself, or the witness from whom comes. 
the testimony impeached or otherwise dis-
credited, or the testimony comes from thos.e 
indirectly interested, and from the nature 
of things it is impossible to secure oppoR.ing 
testimony, as where a witness. testifies that 
a person made a statement or declaration 
l 
I 
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11 
not in the presence of anyone except the 
witness and since deceased. If one of these, 
or an equivalent, is made to appear, of 
course the testimony of a witness may not be 
disbelieved or di&regarded. In other words, 
the commission may not, any more than a 
court or jury, arbitrarily or capriciously 
disbelieve or disregard testimony or evi-
dence." 
In the case of 
Milford Copper Co. of Utah, et al. v. In-
dustrial Commission et al., decided in 
the Supreme Court of Utah in 1922 
and reported at 210 P., page 993, 61 
Utah 37, 
the term ''substantial evidence'' is defined on page 
994 as follows: 
''By 'substantial evidence' is not meant 
that which goes beyond a mere 'scintilla 
of evidence,' since evidence may go beyond 
a mere scintilla and yet not be substan-
tial evidence. Substantial evidence must 
possess something of substance and rel-
evant consequence and not consist of vague, 
uncertain, or irrelevant matter, not carry-
ing the quality of proof or having fitness 
to induce conviction. Substantial evidence 
is such that reasonable men may fairly 
differ as to whether it establishes plain-
tiff's case, and, if all reasonable men must 
conclude that it does. not establish such 
case, then it is not substantial evidence." 
This case wa.s one where the deceased was hurt 
by lwing jerked down the incline of a stope. He 
at once became sick and became progressively 
worJole until he died some time later. The physi-
cians testified that he died from pneumonia and 
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,that this rarely develops in a short time from 
trauma. Their testimony was further that it was not 
1mpos.sible for it to do so. In sustaining the award 
of the Industrial Commission the Supreme Court 
said: 
''From the evidence disclosed by the rec-
ord here no just inference can be drawn 
but that an injury from ,accident either 
was the sole cause of lobar pneumonia or 
that it so accelerated that disease that ulti-
mately death ensued. Upon either theory 
claimants were legally entitled to an 
award.'' 
In the case of 
Roussel v. Coloni~l Sugar Co., Louisiana 
(1933) ; 147 So. 75, 
plaintiff suffered from a fall on June 11, 1930 re-
lsulting in a fracture of the left wing of the sacrum 
and an injury to the lumbar spine. He was treated 
and paid compensation until N ovemher 18, 1930, 
when he was pronounced cured and ordered to re-
turn to work. He was given light work and per-
formed that work until May 2, 1931. He learned 
that he was going to be laid off with others in the 
plant. On May 25, 1931 he made application for 
compensation. On April30, 1931 X-rays were taken 
and it ~was found that the plaintiff had hyper-
trophic arthritis of the spine. The defendant's 
medical testimony was to the effect that when 
plaintiff returned to work in November, 1930 he 
was con1pletely healed. The Court held that the 
''preponderance of the evidence shows that 
the arthritis was the result of the injury 
and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to 
recover.'' 
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The lay eYidence showed plaintiff was well before 
the accident but since the accident he constantly com-
plained of pain and ill health. 
In the case of 
Behan v. John B. Honor Co .• Ltd., P1 al. 
(Louisiana, 1918); 78 So. 589, 
plaintiff injured himself by falling into a river upon 
some wooden piling. The defense was that the 
disability of plaintiff was not caused by the acci-
dent but '"as the result of a disease that was. in his 
system before the accident. There was evidence 
tllat the plaintiff after the accident was suffering 
from locomotor ataxia and medical evidence was 
that 
''an accident such as the one on which this 
suit is founded could not, of itself, have 
produced that disability. But it also 
appears from the expert testimony that the 
one and only disease that does cause loco-
motor ataxia can remain dormant and un-
discovered in the human sys.tem a very 
long time.'' . . . There is no proof in this 
case that the plaintiff would be now or 
ever disabled by locomotor ataxia if the 
accident he complains of had not happened. 
On the contrary, until the accident he was 
apparently in ordinary s.ound health,'' . . . 
''The injuries he suffered by the accident, 
and the immediate change in his physic.al 
condition, leave no reasonable doubt that 
the accident superinduced, and was the 
proximate cause of, the disability of which 
he complains." 
Judgn1ent for the plaintiff was sustained. 
In the case of 
Gable v. State Commission, decided in West 
Virginia in 1932, reported 162 S. E. 
314, 
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compensation was refused by the State Compensa-
tion Commission on the ground that the applicant's 
disability was not caused by· the injury. 
February 6, 1931 the applicant was pinned un-
der a load of coal. His sons lifted it off of him and 
after lying down for a while he resumed, and con-
tinued his work for about 30 days when he became 
unable to work longer. It is the evidence that, 
while he worked after the injury he was unable to 
do as much work as formerly a month or more ,after 
the accident. X-rays were taken and it was found 
that there were no bones fractured in shoulder or 
back where he claim~d to be suffering but that he 
was suffering from arthritis. The doctor found no 
external marks of injury in March following acci-
dent. One doctor (the company physician) testi-
fied that the injury could cause arthritis. 
The Court ·remarked that the applicant was 
able bodied before the accident, had been working 
for the company for six years without the loss of 
a day on account of sickness. 
The Court held the applicant was entitled to 
all reasonabJe inferences in his favor and reversed 
the commission. 
In the case of 
Sunnyside Mining Co. v. Industrial Corn-
mission et al, 151 N. E., 238 Supreme 
Court of Ill (192'6), 
the applicant was injured by being pushed against 
the side of a wall by a car in a mine. There was 
some question in the case whether or not there had 
been an accident at all. The mine clerk testified 
that the applicant had said he was off from work 
a short while because of rheumatism and had not 
mentioned an accident. The commission, however, 
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held that he had an accident and awarded compen-
sation. The doctor testified that in his opinion 
applicant had a long standing arthritic condition all 
up and down his gpine and further that it was not 
due to traun1a. However, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the award on the ground there was sufficient 
evidence that the injury aggravated the condition. 
In the case of 
Hanlon v. Gulf Refining Co. et al, Penn. 
(1934), 175 Atl. 724, 
plaintiff injured his knee by falling. It was found 
he was suffering from arthritis after the accident 
and he became totally disabled. There was very 
little, if any, medical testimony. The Court said, 
''However, in cases of this character:,. proof 
of the relation of cause and effect as to 
the accident and the bodily condition does 
not depend entirely upon professional tes-
timony, whether1 of fiact or of opinion," 
. . . Quoting Baldrige the Court said: 
''Taking into consideration the plaintiff's 
condition before and after the accident, 
his claim was strengthened by the natural 
sequence of events.'' 
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
In the case of 
Bryant v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries, Supreme Court of Washing-
ton ( 1933), 22 Pacific ( 2d) 667, 
the plaintiff was injured on November 25, 1930. 
He was paid compensation from time to time up 
to the early part of 1931. In that year, after com-
plete examination by three doctors appointed by 
the hoard, they recommended that the claimant 
had already received adequate compensation for any 
disability resulting from his injury. They dis-
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covered an arthritic condition of the spine, but re-
ported that it was not caused by the injury. 
On January 11, 1932 the Department of Labor, 
·and Industries refused to make any additional 
award. It seems that there had been six doctors 
who tes.tified that the arthritis was not due to the 
injury. Two doctors, however, testified that the 
arthri:ffic co!Ildition 'in \the spine, appellant never 
having suffered such pains prior to injury, was 
due to the injury. An appeal was taken to the 
Superior Court. This: Court reversed the board's 
ruling and allowed additional awards. An appeal was 
taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
commented on the fact that one of the doctors testi-
fied that ''when the arthritic condition was strictly 
1ocal and not general in the bony joints of the body, 
·he did not consider it caused by focal infection, but 
that his personal opinion was. that it was due to the 
injury.'' 
The Supreme Court held that the Superior 
Court was 
''warranted in accepting the evidence of 
a few expert witness.es as to the cause and 
degree of disability as against several.'' 
The judgment of the Superior Court was 
affirmed. 
In the ca.se of 
Ray v. Department of Labor and Indus-
tries, Supreme Court of Washington, 
(1934), 33 Pac. (2d) 375, 
the plaintiff was injured February 13, 1933 in the 
region of the right hip. He was granted compen-
S·ation from February 19, 1933 to May 10, 1933. 
On the last named date the claim was closed by the 
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board. The Superior Court reversed the board 
and an appeal was made to the Supreme Court . 
. The Supreme Court said that there is but 
''one question presented upon the appeal, 
and that is whether Ray's disability was 
due to the injury or a pre-existing arthritic 
condition, and this is purely a question of 
fact. The evidence shows that, at the time 
he sustained the injury, he had an arth-
ritic condition which was dormant or latent, 
and 'that the injury caus.ed this to become 
lighted up and made active.'' 
The Court further said: 
"The fact that the claimant, at the time 
of the injury, had an arthritic condition 
which was dormant and inactive, would not 
justifv the refusal of compensation. If that 
condition was lighted up and made active 
by the injury, then the condition was the 
re~mlt of the jn]ury, and not of the previous 
arthritic condition." 
The judgment of the Superior Court was 
a! finned. 
In the case of 
Brittain v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries, Supreme Court of Washing-
ton (1934), 35 P. (2d) 49, 
·on N o:vember 7, 1930 the plaintiff was injured, 
but got better and his case was. closed on December' 
30, 1930. 
On April 2, 1932 he received another injury. 
He appealed to the Department for compensation. 
Some compensation was granted but the case later 
closed on the theory that he had a pre-existing con-
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dition of osteo~arthritis to which, it was claimed, 
his present condition resulted. The Superior Court 
then had a hearing and reversed the Department, 
whereupon the board appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
• 
The Court said in its opinion, among other 
things: 
''The appellant seems to have relied almost 
exclusively upon the reported testimony 
of its assistant medical adviser to the effect 
that respondent had the pre-existing dis-
ease of arthritis, which, in his opinion, was 
the cause of respondent's disability. His 
conclusion rested largely on an examina-
tion he claims to have made of which he 
says that the arthritis was caused by in-
fected tonsils) pyorrhea, and enlarged 
postate, which induced infection of the 
gland. His testimony .and conclusions 
were essentially and directly contrary to 
all the other testimony. 
The record shows that respondent weighed 
about 180 pounds. He testified that he was 
forty-five years of age, had worked hard 
all his life, the last six years as a logger 
- bucking logs in the woods - and before 
that had been a farmer; that prior to his 
first injury he never had a pain in his back, 
nor suffered from rheumatism in any part 
of his. body; that he had never liad any dis-
ease, nor been confined in the hospital; that 
after his injuries, especially the second one, 
he got worse and soon was. unable to do 
a goqd day's work, even in his garden, and 
thnt one hip and leg became weak, and that 
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such disability was caused by his accidental 
injuries.'' 
The judgment of the Superior Court wa.s 
affirmed. 
In the case of 
~leQuire v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries, Supreme Court of Washing-
ton (1934), 38 P. (2d) 266, 
the plaintiff was injured by some sort of strain 
while working with a 125-lb. jack-hammer. At the 
time he had an immediate pain in the upper lumbar 
vertebrae. He said that is the only trouble he had. 
The claimant was sent by the Depa.rtment to~ 
physicians to be examined) and these physicians re-
ported that claimant had an arthritic condition of 
the spine. Their testimony was in effect that his 
present condition had nothing to do with the in-
jury. After the reports were in, the joint board 
sustained the action of the Department in closing 
the claim. It was appealed to the Superior Court, 
which sustained the Department's decision. The 
evidence showed that the arthritis was progressive-
ly getting worse. The following is taken from the 
case: 
''Prior to the accident, the claimant had 
engaged in the hardest kind of manual 
labor, such as pushing a wheelbar1·ow filled 
with cement up an incline, which work he 
did without suffering any pain or incon-
venience. He was., even though fifty-two 
years of age, robust and vigorous. As to 
his previous condition, the claimant is sup-
ported, not only by the tes.timony of his 
wife, but by the testimony of two dis-
interested witnesses. The medioal testi-
mony, so far as it touches the question, is 
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that, if the claimant's arthritis had been 
active, manual labor would have caused 
him to suffer pain in his hack. 
The medical testimony offered by the 
claimant was to the effect that, prior to 
the accident, the arthritic condition was 
dormant or inactive, and that it was lighted 
up and made active by the accident. The 
physicians generally seem to agree that in 
many persons of the age of the claimant 
there is an arthritic condition which causes 
no inconvenience until something happens 
which causes it to become active. Five or 
six doctors who had examined the claim-
ant, either by report to the Department or 
testimony before an examiner, gave it as 
their opinion that the claimant's condition 
was the result of the prior arthritic con-
dition, and that had it not been for that 
condition his diahility would have been for 
a comparatively brief period of time. None 
of these doctors, however, express any 
opinion upon the vital question of fact in 
the case, and that is, whether the arth-
ritic condition prior to the accident was 
active or inactive. In answering questions 
as to the extent of the partial permanent 
disability resulting solely from the injury, 
had there been no pre-existing arthritis, 
the doctors necessarily, not only passed 
upon a question of fact, but upon a ques-
tion of law. Without knowing their opin-
ion on the matter of whether the arthritis 
was active or inactive prior to the injury, 
their reports and testimony do not reach 
the real question in the case. We find no 
evidence in the case bearing upon the ques-
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tion, which overcomes the eYidenee offered~ 
by the claimant, from which it would seem 
to irresistibly follow that the arthritic 
condition prior to the accident was dormant 
or inactive.'' 
The judgment of the Superior Court wa.s re-
'Versed and the cause remanded to that Court to 
overrule the order of the joint board of the Depart-
ment and to allow the claim. 
In the case of 
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company, et al. 
v. Slocum, Supreme Court Oklahoma~ 
(1932), 15 P. (2'd) 29, 
the applicant was injured on April 29, 1930 by 
stepping off a barrel with a 75-lb. steam, valve. 
He had the steam valve on his shoulder and walked 
down sort of a stair made of barrels, each staJ r 
being waist high. When he stepped on to the 
cement floor from the last barrel he noticed a pull 
or strain of hi8 left thigh. He continued work that 
day and until 12:00 noon the following day. 
There was considerable testimony to the affect 
that the applicant did not claim to be hurt, claim-
ing that the pain began in the night. He • was hos--
pitalized for· 66 days and was later awarded con-
siderable compensation. There were a great num-
ber of doctors who testified that he had arthritis 
in the left hip caused by infection unrelated to 
trauma. One doctor, however, testified that he at-
tributed the cause of Slocum's disability to in-
fectious arthritis occasioned by trauma resultant 
from the act of walking down the barrel stairway. 
The Supreme Court sustained the a ward of the 
Industrial Commission. 
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In the case of 
Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. In-
dustrial Commission et al., Supreme 
Court of Ill. (1924), 142 N. E. 498, 
applicant was well before the accident which 
occurred on January 29, 1921. When pushing a coal 
car he fell in such a manner as to strike his spine 
on a bumper. Radiographs showed osteo-arthritis 
of the spine and the physicians testified that the 
condition was of several years standing, and that 
trauma might excite a dormant diseas.ed condition. 
Judgment for applicant affirmed. 
According to the case of 
Carlson v. E. H. Shelson & Co. et al., 
decided in the Supreme Court of 
Michigan, 1933 and reported at 251 
N. E. 369, 
the defendant has to show by competent testimony 
that the applicant after the compensible injury is 
no longer incapacitated. In that case plaintiff's 
arm was struck by a board and it was injured. He 
went back to work after being paid compensation 
.and was later laid off work. He made application 
for further compensation to the Department of 
Labor and Industry. Compensation was denied. 
It developed that he had arthritis in the region of 
the elbow. The Supreme Court reversed the De-
partment of Labor and Industries saying: 
"We do not believe that there is any testi-
mony showing that plaintiff is no longer in-
capacitated as a result of his original in-
jury." 
Since Dr. Richards' opinion was that there was 
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no evidence to show that his present condition was 
a result of the injury, the case of 
Perry Coal Company v. Industrial Com-
m!ssion et al., Supreme Court of Ill. 
(19:28), reported 163 N. E. 681, 
is an interesting case to show that lay testimony 
sometimes over:oomes that of medical testimony. 
Plaintiff was injured by falling on a tie. Doctor 
contended there was no evidence of injury. The 
Court said: 
"The testimony of Roberts as to his injury 
and as to his inability to work since Octo-
ber 18, 1924, is not overcome by the testi-
mony of the witnesses . . . that flieir ex-
amination disclosed no physical evidence of 
an injury.'' · 
Examination showed the applicant had hyper-
trophic osteo-arthritis, with fixation of all his lum-
bar vertebrae. The applicant was doing his work 
before the accident but was totally disabled after 
the accident. The Court sustained the award for 
the applicant with this statement: 
''The diseased physical condition of the 
employee is immaterial where the accidental 
injury is the proximate . cause of his phys-
ical condition.'' 
:Medicine is not an exact science, and even un-
der those conditions, to get the best results some 
sort of process of elimination should be used. For 
instance in order to prove that a condition existing 
is a traumatic arthritis it is necessary that several 
joints of the body be X-rayed as well as the part 
involved. ( 3rd Tr. 24). 
X-rays of the elbow and knee were taken and 
all the testimony shows tha.t there is no arthritic 
condition there. 
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It is admitted that the most frequent cause of 
hypertrophic arthritis is not infection but trauma. 
(3d Tr. 18). Is it not probable that the trauma 
.caus.ed the increase of symptoms in this case~ 
If the decision of the Industrial Commission is 
a result of surmise it should be reversed. That is 
lthe holding, of the Court on numerous occasions. 
What is the meaning of the word ''surmise.'' Web-
;,sfer 's dictionary states it as follows: ''To imagine 
without certain knowledge ;to infer on slight grounds; 
to suppose or conjecture.'' Should not the appli-
cant be given the benefit of any doubts? The re-
port of the referee referred to as No. 25 in the 
documents will be found a statement which is inter-
esting in this respect. He states. in the last par-
,agraph of his report, ''I am frankly in some doubt 
about the matter. However, I think I should be 
inclined to a denial were I called upon to make the 
decision myself.'' Thus it appears clearly, that so 
far as those recommendations are concerned the 
referee is giving not the plaintiff but the defendant 
the benefit of the doubt. 
Again I call the Court's attention to the fact 
~that before the accident ~1:r. Pecharich was an able 
bodied and strong man. After the accident he 
could not do the work properly. (Tr. 13· and 14). 
He worked regularly before the accident and was 
healthy for about 25 years. (Tr. 24, 25, 26, 27, 42, 
47, 68, 69, 97, 101 and 102; 2d Tr. 7, 8, 21, 2'2, 
27 and 34). He was very seldom out of work 
since 1912. He did hard physical labor and had 
never been sick except in 1918 ·when he was out of 
work about eight days because of flu. (Tr. 27). He 
never had rheumatism in his life before the acci-
dent. (Tr. 27, 68 and 107). Charles. Bezyack, who 
had been secretary of the Austrian Lodge, said 
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that he has known the applicant for fifteen years 
and he never had rheun1atism before August 6, 1937 
a.nd that he did not report through the Lodge, while 
he was secretary, which was at least during the 
year 1937, that Pecharich had rheun1atism. (Tr. 
!l6, 97 and 98). Dr. A. R.. Demman testified that in 
his opinion the injury was the cause of applicant's 
present condition and that even though he had 
osteo-arthritis before the accident tbat the accident 
aggravated it. (Tr. 90). Dr. George A. \Vilson and 
Dr. A. K. Bramwell testified to practically the same 
thing as stated above. Dr. :Martin C. Linden, wit~ 
ness for the defendant, testified that 
"If the trauma had been great enough, it is 
possible and most probable that a severe 
injury to the spine, without the presence of 
arthritis deformans, might cause it." (3rd 
Tr. 37 and 38). 
There is no dispute about the fact that appli-
cant received an injury to the spine of sufficient 
force to require it to b~ taped and to cause bruises 
and contusions. 
There is no dispute about the fact that tberP-
was a subluxation of the vertebrae, in the atlas re-
gion, in the region of the fourth lumbar and in the 
region of the sacrum. (2d Tr. 45, 46 and 48). 
Errors numbered 3, 4 and 5 are similar, there-
fore, they will be discussed together. 
Section 42-1-11 of Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1933, 
provides that the commission may employ ''exam-
Iners." Upon reading that section it can be readily 
seen that it refers to the administrative work and 
not to th~ judicial work of the commission. 
If they have power to appoint a third party 
to sit in a hearing for them it would no doubt come 
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section provides that the commission shall have 
power to appoint agents for the ''purpose of mak-
ing any investigation with regard to any employ-
ment or place of employment.'' It does not pro-
vide for these agents to take evidence as referees 
in compensation hearings. Even though such 
authority was given by that section it does not 
:appear from the files and records in this case 
either that such appointment was made by the com-
mission by "an order in writing'' as provided in 
said section, or that the referee before proceeding 
with the evidence was "sworn well and truly to 
hear and determine the facts'' as provided in Sec-
tion 104--27-7 of s.aid compiled laws. The commis-
'sioners themselves and the judges have to be proper-
ly sworn to well and truly perform their duties. 
·Why should a less obligation he placed upon the 
referee or examiner. He certainly could not carry 
much weight in attempting to deliver oaths. He had 
no authority to administer oaths as he did in this 
case. (Tr. 67 and 86). 
Is not there a reason for the rule adopted by 
the Supreme Court that the Industrial Commission 
shall he triers of the facts 1 Is not this reason that 
ithey are, as in the case of any trial court, better 
1able to get at the truth than would be the Supreme 
;Court~ The Supreme Court has only the written 
evidence before it while the triers of the facts can 
see .and hear the witnesses, notice the tone of their 
.voices, their gesticulations, expressions and de-
meanor upon the witness stand. In the case at bar 
none of the commissioners saw or heard a single 
:witness. They were not in near as favorable situa-
'ition to try the facts as is the Supreme Court. There 
were three of them as agninst five in the Supreme 
Court a.nd then onJy two of those participated be-
~ause Commissioner Knerr was ill. Then too, the 
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Suprerne Court has the advantages of counsels' 
briefs whereas the Industrial Commission had 
none. It never was contemplated by the legislature 
that the Industrial Commission should delegate an 
examiner or referee to try its cases. It certainly 
did not contemplate cases being tried by an ag1ent 
not under oath. 
Thus it appears that the commission acted 
without authority in attempting to delegate its 
powers to a third party, its decision was capricious 
and as a result of surmise, there is no substantial 
evidence to support the decision, the great weight 
of evidence indicates compensation should be 
awarded and it should have granted applicant's 
motion for new trial. 
Hence the applicant submits that the decision 
of the Industrial Commission denying, compensation 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, 
Attorney for Applicant. 
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